The Stability of Walrasian General Equilibrium

Herbert Gintis and Antoine Mandel

Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne from Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne

Abstract: We prove the stability of equilibrium in a completely decentralized Walrasian general equilibrium economy in which prices are fully controlled by economic agents, with production and trade occuring out of equilibrium

Keywords: General Equilibrium; exchange economies; bargaining games; stability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C62 D51 D58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

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Related works:
Working Paper: The Stability of Walrasian General Equilibrium (2013)
Working Paper: The Stability of Walrasian General Equilibrium (2012)
Working Paper: The Stability of Walrasian General Equilibrium (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mse:cesdoc:12065

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