Stochastic stability in the Scarf economy

Antoine Mandel and Herbert Gintis

Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne from Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne

Abstract: We present a mathematical model for the analysis of the bargaining games based on private prices used by Gintis to simulate the dynamics of prices in exchange economies, see [Gintis 2007]. We then characterize, in the Scarf economy, a class of dynamics for which the Walrasian equilibrium is the only stochastically stable state. Hence, we provide dynamic foundations for general equilibrium for one of the best-known example of instability of the tâtonement process

Keywords: General Equilibrium; exchange economies; bargaining games; stochastic stability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C62 C63 C78 D51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Related works:
Journal Article: Stochastic stability in the Scarf economy (2014)
Working Paper: Stochastic Stability in the Scarf Economy (2014)
Working Paper: Stochastic Stability in the Scarf Economy (2014)
Working Paper: Stochastic Stability in the Scarf Economy (2014)
Working Paper: Stochastic stability in the Scarf economy (2013)
Working Paper: Stochastic stability in the Scarf economy (2012)
Working Paper: Stochastic stability in the Scarf economy (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mse:cesdoc:12066

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