« L'économie des discriminations » peut-elle se passer d'une « philosophie économique des discriminations ? »

Cléo Chassonnery-Zaïgouche ()
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Cléo Chassonnery-Zaïgouche: Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne, https://centredeconomiesorbonne.cnrs.fr

Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne from Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne

Abstract: Since the 1950's, Nobel Prize economists such as Akerlof, Arrow, Becker, Heckman, Phelps and Stiglitz have analyzed discrimination in an economic framework, essentially in "positive" perspective. The two seminal models – Becker's model based on a "taste for discrimination" and Arrow and Phelps' theories of "statistical discrimination" – give two different answers to the implicit question of efficiency. Discrimination is inefficient – by assumption – in Becker's work because it's a « non-monetary cost », whereas discrimination could be efficient – in some cases – in statistical discrimination models. When discrimination is efficient, the normative basis disappears and no political recommendations could be made. The eficiency criterion is not sufficient to analyze discrimination both in a « positive » and in a « normative » perspective. The paper discusses two principles to renew this analysis: 1) individuals make choice using normative criteria; 2) the non-discrimination principle is lexically prior to an efficiency criterion

Keywords: Discrimination; statistical discrimination; normative economics; positive economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A13 B40 B41 J7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23 pages
Date: 2012-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hme and nep-hpe
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mse:cesdoc:12068

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