Which compensation for whom?

Pascal Gastineau () and Emmanuelle Taugourdeau
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Pascal Gastineau: IFSTTAR

Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne from Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne

Abstract: This paper examines a situation where a decision-maker determines the appropriate compensation that should be implemented for a given ecological damage. The compensation can be either or both in monetary and environmental units to meet three goals: i) no aggregate welfare loss, ii) minimization of the cost associated with the compensation, iii) minimal environmental compensation requirement. The findings suggest that - in some cases - providing both monetary and environmental compensation can be the best option. We also emphasize the impact of implementing a minimal environmental compensation constraint especially in terms of equity and cost efficiency

Keywords: Environmental damage; compensation; welfare; inequity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H43 Q51 Q57 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 29 pages
Date: 2012-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-env and nep-reg
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http://mse.univ-paris1.fr/pub/mse/CES2012/12080.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Which compensation for whom ? (2012)
Working Paper: Which compensation for whom ? (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mse:cesdoc:12080

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