Optimal Rationing within a Heterogenous Population

Philippe Choné and Stephane Gauthier

Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne from Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne

Abstract: A government agency delegates to a provider (hospital, medical gatekeeper, school, social worker) the decision to supply a service or treatment to individual recipients. The agency does not perfectly know the distribution of individual treatment costs in the population. The single-crossing property is not satisfied when the uncertainty pertains to the dispersion of the distribution. We find that the provision of service should then be distorted upwards relative to efficiency when the (first-best) efficient number of recipients is sufficiently high

Keywords: Rationing; screening; universal coverage; upward distortion; Spence-Mirrlees condition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D61 D82 I18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 13 pages
Date: 2014-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
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ftp://mse.univ-paris1.fr/pub/mse/CES2014/14032.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Optimal rationing within a heterogeneous population (2017)
Working Paper: Optimal Rationing within a Heterogeneous Population (2017)
Working Paper: Optimal Rationing within a Heterogeneous Population (2017)
Working Paper: Optimal Rationing within a Heterogeneous Population (2017)
Working Paper: Optimal Rationing within a Heterogeneous Population (2014)
Working Paper: Optimal Rationing within a Heterogeneous Population (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mse:cesdoc:14032

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