Abstract Economies with Endogenous Sharing Rules

Philippe Bich () and Rida Laraki ()
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Philippe Bich: Paris School of Economics - Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne, https://centredeconomiesorbonne.univ-paris1.fr
Rida Laraki: LAMSADE - Université de Dauphine et Département d'Economie - Ecole Polytechnique, https://sites.google.com/site/ridalaraki/

Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne from Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne

Abstract: Endogenous sharing rules was introduced by Simon and Zame to model payoff indeterminacy in discontinuous games. Their main result concerns the existence of a solution, i.e., a mixed Nash equilibrium and an associated sharing rule. This note extends their result to abstract economies where, by definition, players are restricted to pure strategies, and provide an interpretation of Simon and Zame's model in terms of preference incompleteness

Keywords: abtract economies; endogenous sharing rules; competitive equilibrium; incomplete and discontinuous preferences; better-reply security (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C02 C62 C72 D50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 14 pages
Date: 2015-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo, nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-ore
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mse:cesdoc:15058

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