Optimality of deductible for Yaari's model: a reappraisal

Alain Chateauneuf, Michèle Cohen, Mina Mostoufi and Jean-Christophe Vergnaud

Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne from Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne

Abstract: The main purpose of this paper is to show that left monotone risk aversion, a meaningful refinement of strong risk aversion, characterizes Yaari's decision makers for whom deductible insurance is optimal. A second goal is to offer a detailed proof of the deductible's computation, which proves the tractability of Yaari's model under left-monotone risk aversion

Keywords: Yaari's model; Jewitt's left-monotone risk aversion; optimality of deductible (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D80 D81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 18 pages
Date: 2015-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ias and nep-upt
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ftp://mse.univ-paris1.fr/pub/mse/CES2015/15072.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Optimality of deductible for Yaari's model: a reappraisal (2015)
Working Paper: Optimality of deductible for Yaari's model: a reappraisal (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mse:cesdoc:15072

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