No-arbitrage and Equilibrium in Finite Dimension: A General Result

Thai Ha-Huy, Cuong Le Van (), Frank Page () and Myrna Wooders
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Cuong Le Van: Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - Paris School of Economics, IPAG Business School, https://centredeconomiesorbonne.univ-paris1.fr
Frank Page: Indiana University

Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne from Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne

Abstract: We consider an exchange economy with a finite number of assets and a finite number of agents. The utility functions of the agents are concave, strictly increasing and their suprema equal infity. We use weak no-arbitrage prices a la Dana and Le Van [5]. Our main result is: an equilibrium exists if, and only if, their exists a weak no-arbitrage price common to all the agents

Keywords: asset market equilibrium; individually rational attainable allocations; individually rational utility set; no-arbitrage prices; weak no-arbitrage prices; no-arbitrage condition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C62 D50 D81 D84 G1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 22 pages
Date: 2017-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-upt
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ftp://mse.univ-paris1.fr/pub/mse/CES2017/17023.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: No-arbitrage and Equilibrium in Finite Dimension: A General Result (2017)
Working Paper: No-arbitrage and Equilibrium in Finite Dimension: A General Result (2017)
Working Paper: No-arbitrage and Equilibrium in Finite Dimension: A General Result (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mse:cesdoc:17023

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