A model of anonymous influence with anti-conformist agents
Alexis Poindron () and
Agnieszka Rusinowska ()
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Alexis Poindron: Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne, http://centredeconomiesorbonne.univ-paris1.fr
Agnieszka Rusinowska: Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - Paris School of Economics, https://sites.google.com/site/rusinowskagrabisch/
Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne from Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne
We study a stochastic model of anonymous influence with conformist and anti-conformist individuals. Each agent with a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ initial opinion on a certain issue can change his opinion due to social influence. We consider anonymous influence, which depends on the number of agents having a certain opinion, but not on their identity. An individual is conformist/anti-conformist if his probability of saying ‘yes’ increases/decreases with the number of ‘yes’- agents. In order to consider a society in which both conformists and anti-conformists co-exist, we investigate a generalized aggregation mechanism based on ordered weighted averages. Additionally, every agent has a coefficient of conformism which is a real number in [-1, 1], with negative/positive values corresponding to anti-conformists/conformists. The two extreme values -1 and 1 represent a pure anti-conformist and a pure conformist, respectively, and the remaining values - so called ‘mixed’ agents. We consider two kinds of a society: without mixed agents, and with mixed agents who play randomly either as conformists or anti-conformists. For both cases of the model, we deliver a qualitative analysis of convergence, i.e., find all absorbing classes and conditions for their occurence
Keywords: influence; anonymity; anti-conformism; convergence; absorbing class (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D7 D85 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 33 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
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Working Paper: A model of anonymous influence with anti-conformist agents (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mse:cesdoc:17047
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