The core of supermodular games on finite distributive lattices

Michel Grabisch and Tomáš Kroupa ()
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Tomáš Kroupa: Czech Academy of Sciences, Prague

Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne from Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne

Abstract: In this article, we study supermodular functions on finite distributive lattices. Relaxing the assumption that the domain is a powerset of a finite set, we focus on geometrical properties of the polyhedral cone of such functions. Specifically, we generalize the criterion for extremal rays and study the face lattice of the supermodular cone. An explicit description of facets by the corresponding tight linear inequalities is provided

Keywords: supermodular/submodular function; core; coalitional game; polyhedral cone (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 22 pages
Date: 2018-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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ftp://mse.univ-paris1.fr/pub/mse/CES2018/18010.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: The cone of supermodular games on finite distributive lattices (2019)
Working Paper: The cone of supermodular games on finite distributive lattices (2019)
Working Paper: The cone of supermodular games on finite distributive lattices (2019)
Working Paper: The cone of supermodular games on finite distributive lattices (2018)
Working Paper: The cone of supermodular games on finite distributive lattices (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mse:cesdoc:18010

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