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New method to detect convergence in simple multi-period market games with infinite large strategy spaces

Jørgen Vitting Andersen () and Philippe de Peretti ()
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Jørgen Vitting Andersen: Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne
Philippe de Peretti: Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne, http://www.univ-paris1.fr/recherche/page-perso/page/?uid=peretti

Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne from Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne

Abstract: We introduce a new methodology that enables the detection of onset of convergence towards Nash equilibria, in simple repeated-games with infinite large strategy spaces. The method works by constraining on a special and finite subset of strategies. We illustrate how the method can predict (in special time periods) with a high success rate the action of participants in a series of experiments

Keywords: multi-period games; infinite strategy space; decoupling; bounded rationality; agent-based modeling (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C15 C53 C73 C92 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
Date: 2018-12
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mse:cesdoc:18038

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