Winning Coalitions in Plurality Voting Democracies

René van den Brink (), Dinko Dimitrov and Agnieszka Rusinowska
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René van den Brink: Department of Econometrics and Tinbergen Institute, VU University Amsterdam

Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne from Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne

Abstract: We study the issue of assigning weights to players that identify winning coalitions in plurality voting democracies. For this, we consider plurality games which are simple games in partition function form such that in every partition there is at least one winning coalition. Such a game is said to be precisely supportive if it possible to assign weights to players in such a way that a coalition being winning in a partition implies that the combined weight of its members is maximal over all coalitions in the partition. A plurality game is decisive if in every partition there is exactly one winning coalition. We show that decisive plurality games with at most four players, majority games with an arbitrary number of players, and almost symmetric decisive plurality games with an arbitrary number of players are precisely supportive. Complete characterizations of a partition's winning coalitions are provided as well

Keywords: plurality game; plurality voting; precise support; simple game in partition function form; winning coalition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D62 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28 pages
Date: 2019-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-des, nep-gth and nep-mic
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ftp://mse.univ-paris1.fr/pub/mse/CES2019/19018.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Winning coalitions in plurality voting democracies (2021)
Working Paper: Winning coalitions in plurality voting democracies (2021)
Working Paper: Winning coalitions in plurality voting democracies (2021)
Working Paper: Winning coalitions in plurality voting democracies (2021)
Working Paper: Winning Coalitions in Plurality Voting Democracies (2019)
Working Paper: Winning Coalitions in Plurality Voting Democracies (2019)
Working Paper: Winning Coalitions in Plurality Voting Democracies (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mse:cesdoc:19018

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