Player-centered incomplete cooperative games

Martin Cerny () and Michel Grabisch
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Martin Cerny: Charles University, Prague, Czech Republic

Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne from Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne

Abstract: The computation of a solution concept of a cooperative game usually employs values of all coalitions. However, in somme applications, the values of some of the coalitions might be unknown due to high costs associated with their determination or simply because it is not possible to determine them exactly. We introduce a method to approximate standard solution concepts based only on partial characteristic function of the cooperative game. In this paper, we build on our previous results and generalise the results of our methods to a significantly larger class of structures of incomplete information

Keywords: cooperative game; incomplete game; Shapley value; core; tau-value (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 22 pages
Date: 2023-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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http://mse.univ-paris1.fr/pub/mse/CES2023/23006.pdf (application/pdf)
https://shs.hal.science/halshs-04070009

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mse:cesdoc:23006

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