Welfare improvement properties of an allowance market in a production economy

Antoine Mandel

Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne from Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne

Abstract: This paper studies the welfare improvement properties of a market of allowances in an economy with a single type of externality. We show that thanks to the opening of such a market the Pareto optima can be decentralized as marginal pricing equilibria. However, the set of equilibria is much larger than this of Pareto optima. In order to discriminate the efficient equilibria we introduce a demand revealing mechanism tailored for this framework

Keywords: General equilibrium theory; Pareto Optimality; externalities; markets of allowances (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D51 D62 Q54 Q58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 13 pages
Date: 2007-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
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Published in Annals of Economics and Statistics, 93/94, 2009, pp.67-77

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https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00155803 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Welfare Improvement Properties of an Allowance Market in a Production Economy (2009)
Working Paper: Welfare Improvement Properties of an Allowance Market in a Production Economy (2009)
Working Paper: Welfare improvement properties of an allowance market in a production economy (2007)
Working Paper: Welfare improvement properties of an allowance market in a production economy (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mse:cesdoc:b07029

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