Nash equilibrium existence for some discontinuous games

Philippe Bich
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Philippe Bich: Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne

Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne from Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne

Abstract: Answering to an open question of Herings et al. (see [3]), one extends their fixed point theorem to mappings defined on convex compact subset of Rn, and not only polytopes. Such extension is important in non-cooperative game theory, where typical strategy sets are convex and compact. An application in game theory is given

Keywords: Discontinuous game; Nash equilibrium; fixed point theorem (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C60 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 09 pages
Date: 2007-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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