Heterogeneous lobbying efficiency

Julien Vauday

Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne from Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne

Abstract: Firms are actively involved in the formation of policies. So far, the literature has focused on the relationship between exposure to the competition and the level of protection. The ability of lobbies to achieve a more favorable policy is then directly related to the reaction of their welfare to the policy. This monotonic relationship contradicts the idea that all lobbies do not have the same efficiency. Indeed, this efficiency cannot be uniquely driven by the exposure to competition. This paper proposes an original approach of the lobbying activity taking into account that lobbies' efficiency is heterogeneous. Just as there are some skilled and unskilled cards players. This paper highlights two types of efficiency, the passive and the active. First, according to the sensitivity of the government to the policy, two lobbies equally affected by the policy may pay different contributions to obtain the same protection level. Second, if the active efficiency is introduced, then two lobbies exhibiting the same sensitivity to the policy may obtain two different equilibrium policies

Keywords: Endogeneous policy decision; strategic lobbying; heterogeneous efficiency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D70 F13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 34 pages
Date: 2008-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pol
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ftp://mse.univ-paris1.fr/pub/mse/CES2008/Bla08053.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Heterogeneous Lobbying Efficiency (2008)
Working Paper: Heterogeneous Lobbying Efficiency (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mse:cesdoc:bla08053

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