Macroeconomic performance and wage setting level in symmetric non-cooperative games

Pierre Cahuc

Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques from Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1)

Abstract: This paper shows that the relationship between the wage and the wage setting level is necessarily monotonic in symmetric non cooperative games between monopoly Trade Unions, when the conditions of stability of Nash equilibria are taken into account. Moreover, the Trade Unions' welfare raises with the degree of centralisation

Pages: 6 pages
Date: 1994-01
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Published in Economics Letters, 48, 3–4, 1995, pp. 427-432

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Journal Article: Macroeconomic performance and wage setting level in symmetric non-cooperative games (1995)
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