Asymmetric information, non-additive expected utility and the information revealed by prices: a simple example

Jean-Marc Tallon

Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques from Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1)

Abstract: In this note we develop a simple example of a model in which agents have asymmetric information, and preferences that are represented by a non-additive expected utility function. Even in the finite case, that is when the equilibrium price function is fully revealing, it can be worth for an a priori uninformed agent to buy some private information, if he is more confident in that information than in the one revealed by the price system

Pages: 10 pages
Date: 1994-11
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Related works:
Working Paper: Asymmetric Information, Non-Additive Expected Utility and the Information Revealed by Prices: A Simple Example (1994)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mse:wpsorb:94027

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