The core-partition of hedonic games

Vincent Iehlé

Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques from Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1)

Abstract: A pure hedonic game describes the situation where player's utility depends only on the identity of the members of the group he belongs to. The paper provides a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of core-partition in hedonic games. The condition is based on a new concept of balancedness, called pivotal balancedness. pivotal balancedness involves especially the notion pivotal distribution that associates to each coalition a sub-group of players in the coalition. Then, we proceed to a review of several sufficient conditions for core-partition existence showing how the results can be unified through suitably chosen pivotal distributions

Keywords: Hedonic game; group formation; core-partition; balancedness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 11 pages
Date: 2005-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences, 54, (2), 2007, pp.176-185

Downloads: (external link)
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00197528 (application/pdf)
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2007.05.007

Related works:
Journal Article: The core-partition of a hedonic game (2007)
Working Paper: The core-partition of hedonic games (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mse:wpsorb:b05091

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