The core of a coalitional exchange economy

Elena del Mercato

Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques from Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1)

Abstract: In pure exchange economies, a poor attention has been given to how the individual consumption possibilities of the members of a coalition should be represented. It seems economically reasonable that our knowledge and our possibility to make decisions depend on the coalition we belong to. We define a coalitional exchange economy by considering a pure exchange economy in which the individual consumption sets of consumers within a coalition depend on the membership of the coalition. Our definition includes as a particular case the classical definition of pure exchange economy. We adapt the core concept to a coalitional exchange economy, and we show the non-emptiness of the core. Finally, we discuss more general setting where individual preferences are also depending on the coalitions

Keywords: Cooperative game; core; exchange economy; consumption possibility (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 7 pages
Date: 2006-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Working Paper: The Core of a coalitional exchange economy (2006)
Working Paper: The Core of a coalitional exchange economy (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mse:wpsorb:b06047

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