Vers une règlementation bancaire plus flexible: développement d'un modèle d'autosélection

Jézabel Couppey
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Jézabel Couppey: TEAM, Université Paris 1

Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques from Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1)

Abstract: The new adaptation of banking prudential regulation to market risks notably have led regulatory authorities to admit internal control and to attach more importance to reporting and disclosures policy. So, regulatory authorities tend to follow the recommendations extracted from the theory of the contracts: Prudential regulation has to be graded with bank's information revealing their risk. In this article, we present a self-selection model applied to banking regulation. We aim to derive the properties of a more flexible regulation following two major contributions on the subject, Giammarino, Lewis, Sappington (1993) and Bensaid, Pagès Rochet (1995). The interest of our model is fond of the relative nature of the incentive problem which must be solved by the regulator. Thus, it contributes to reconcile the opposite results of the two cited contributions

Keywords: banking; prudential regulation; information asymetries; adverse selection (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D8 G2 L5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 21 pages
Date: 1999-10
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mse:wpsorb:bla99093

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