Biens publics et défense européenne: quel processus d'allocation ?

Martial Foucault (martial.foucault@sciencespo.fr)

Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques from Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1)

Abstract: The European Union has decided to implement in 1999 an independent European security and defence policy (ESDP). As States' preferences in defence issues are characterized by a strong heterogeneity, I propose to determine the kind of allocation process for providing defence resources. By assuming European security as an impure public good due to spillin effects, this article aims at evaluating whether as Nash-Cournot or Lindhal process is better suitable for the ESDP. Based on an econometric analysis for the 1980-2002 period, it is concluded that the Europe of Defence follows a Nash-Cournot process for 10 out of 15 countries. This result strengthens the interdependency of defence policies for defining a common security need

Keywords: Public good provision; defence spending; allocation process; free-riding; Nash-Cournot; Lindhal (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H0 H56 H87 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 21 pages
Date: 2005-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-eec and nep-pbe
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https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00197130 (application/pdf)

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Working Paper: Biens publics et défense européenne: quel processus d'allocation ? (2005)
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