From Walrasian General Equilibrium to Incomplete Contracts: Making Sense of Institutions

Mehrdad Vahabi

Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques from Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1)

Abstract: This article explores the specific contribution of recent literature on incomplete contracts in comparison with the acontractual Walrasian general equilibrium as well as the complete optimal contracts of the Agency theory regarding the institutional identity of agents. It underlines a tension between the theoretical justification of contractual incompleteness on the one hand, and rationality postulate, on the other hand. It concludes the relevance of bounded rationality assumption and temporary equilibrium framework to overcome some logical incoherences of present incomplete contracts literature. This brings closer two important branches of new institutional economics, namely the Transaction Costs Economics and the Property Rights approach

Keywords: New institutional economics; Walrasian General Equilibrium; agency theory, incomplete contracts (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D5 K11 K12 L22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 27 pages
Date: 1999-01
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Published in Économie et institutions, (1), 2002, pp. 99-143

Downloads: (external link)
https://shs.hal.science/halshs-03704424 (application/pdf)
https://doi.org/10.4000/ei.709

Related works:
Working Paper: From Walrasian general equilibrium to incomplete contracts: making sense of institutions (2002)
Working Paper: From Walrasian General Equilibrium to Incomplete Contracts: Making Sense of Institutions (1999)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mse:wpsorb:j99008

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques from Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Lucie Label ().