A note on the impossibility of a set of constitutions stable at different levels

Nicolas Houy

Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques from Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1)

Abstract: We demonstrate that no set of neutral and different social choice correspondences exists, so that, if proposed to a group of individuals, it leads to a uniquely defined society, stable in an intuitive sense. Weakening this latter condition makes it possible to reintroduce possibility. This appearance reveals itself as only transitory if seen as a way to escape the multiplicity of solutions problem in social choice theory. This last result is obtained by generalizing the concept of stability to higher levels

Keywords: Social choice correspondence; stability; self-selectivity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 17 pages
Date: 2004-04
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mse:wpsorb:v04039

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