First degree discrimination in a competitive setting: pricing and quality choice

David Encaoua () and Abraham Hollander
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Abraham Hollander: Université de Montréal

Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques from Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1)

Abstract: The paper investigates competition in price schedules among vertically differentiated producers. First order price discrimination leading to personalized prices is the perfect equilibrium of the two-stage game where firms choose at the first stage to commit or not to a uniform price and compete at the second stage. Whether the profits earned by both firms are larger or smaller under discrimination than under uniform pricing depends on the quality gap between firms and on the disparity of consumer preferences. Finally, firms engaged in first degree discrimination choose quality levels that are optimal from a welfare perspective

Keywords: Price discrimination; price schedules; personalized prices; vertical differentiation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D4 L11 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25 pages
Date: 2004-12
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https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00193447 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: First degree discrimination in a competitive setting: pricing and quality choice (2004)
Working Paper: First degree discrimination in a competitive setting: pricing and quality choice (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mse:wpsorb:v05010

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