Cournot competition in spatial markets: some complementary results on complementarity
Andreea Cosnita-Langlais
Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques from Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1)
Abstract:
We study location equilibria for Cournot oligopolies selling complementary goods. For a single-store triopoly, we prove that the circular market also yields partial diamentrical dispersion besides total agglomeration. We turn to multi-plant duopolies and in contrast to other contributions on the topic, we allow firms to sell more than one product. We confirm the intuition that total agglomeration of outlets is always an equilibrium, whatever the market shape. However, the circular case also exhibits intra-firm agglomeration and inter-firm equal distance dispersion. This is a pattern never before obtained, entirely due to the assumption of intra-firm product complementarity
Keywords: Complementary products; multi-store competition; spatial Cournot model (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 L13 R32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 21 pages
Date: 2005-10, Revised 2006-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-geo, nep-ind, nep-mic and nep-ure
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https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00196099 (application/pdf)
Related works:
Journal Article: Cournot competition in spatial markets: a complementary result on complementarity (2011) 
Working Paper: Cournot competition in spatial markets: some complementary results on complementarity (2005) 
Working Paper: Cournot competition in spatial markets: some complementary results on complementarity (2005) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mse:wpsorb:v05061
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