On the effective design of the efficiency defence

Andreea Cosnita-Langlais and Jean-Philippe Tropeano

Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques from Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1)

Abstract: The efficiency defence was long delayed in the European merger control due to costly implementation issues. In this paper we argue that the upstream consequences of the efficiency defence should equally be considered, namely the improvement of the distribution of notified mergers through the incentives it provides towards more efficient mergers. First of all, we show that even if the Competition Authority may not tell apart the mergers that rightfully invoke the efficiency defence from those that do not, allowing such a procedure can lead to a lower post-merger price. Secondly, we study the impact of merger remedies on the incentives conveyed by the efficiency defence, and conclude on the optimal design of the efficiency defence procedure

Keywords: Merger control; efficiency defence; merger remedies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 K21 L41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 21 pages
Date: 2006-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-law
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https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00113503 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Do remedies affect the efficiency defense? An optimal merger-control analysis (2012)
Working Paper: On the Effective Design of the Efficiency Defence (2006)
Working Paper: On the Effective Design of the Efficiency Defence (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mse:wpsorb:v06030

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