Hierarchical Organization and Performance Inequality: Evidence from Professional Cycling

Bertrand Candelon and Arnaud Dupuy (arnauddupuy74@gmail.com)

No 2012/12, Working Papers from Maastricht School of Management

Abstract: This paper proposes an equilibrium theory of the organization of work in an economy with an implicit market for productive time. In this market, agents buy or sell productive time. This implicit mar- ket gives rise to the formation of teams, organized in hierarchies with one leader (buyer) at the top and helpers (sellers) below. Relative to autarky, hierarchical organization leads to higher within and between team payo¤s/productivity inequality. This prediction is tested empir- ically in the context of professional road cycling. We show that the observed rise in performance inequality in the peloton since the 1970s is merely due to a rise in help intensity within team and consistent with a change in the hierarchical organization of teams.

Keywords: Hierarchical organization; productive time; helping time; inequality; professional cycling (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D2 D3 L22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 77 pages
Date: 2012-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hrm and nep-spo
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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http://web2.msm.nl/RePEc/msm/wpaper/MSM-WP2012-12.pdf First version, 2012 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: HIERARCHICAL ORGANIZATION AND PERFORMANCE INEQUALITY: EVIDENCE FROM PROFESSIONAL CYCLING (2015)
Working Paper: Hierarchical Organization and Performance Inequality: Evidence from Professional Cycling (2014)
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