Innis Lecture: Can the Theory of Incentives Explain Decentralization?

Michel Poitevin

Cahiers de recherche from Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques

Abstract: This survey presents within a single model three theories of decentralization of decision-making within organizations based on private information and incentives. Renegotiation, collusion, and limits on communication are three sufficient conditions for decentralization to be optimal.

Keywords: organizational design; ivate information; decentralization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D81 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 41 pages
Date: 2000
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (26)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mtl:montde:2000-13

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