Probabilistic Assignments of Identical Indivisible Objects and Uniform Probabilistic Rules

Lars Ehlers and Bettina Klaus ()

Cahiers de recherche from Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques

Abstract: We consider a probabilistic approach to the problem of assigning k indivisible identical objects to a set of agents with single-peaked preferences. Using the ordinal extension of preferences, we characterize the class of uniform probabilistic rules by Pareto efficiency, strategy-proofness, and no-envy. We also show that in this characterization no-envy cannot be replaced by anonymity. When agents are strictly risk averse von-Neumann-Morgenstern utility maximizers, then we reduce the problem of assigning k identical objects to a problem of allocating the amount k of an infinitely divisible commodity.

Keywords: obabilistic rules; single-aked eferences; strategy-oofness; uniform allocations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C10 D60 D61 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25 pages
Date: 2001
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Probabilistic assignments of identical indivisible objects and uniform probabilistic rules (2003)
Working Paper: Probabilistic Assignements of Identical Indivisible Objects and Uniform Probabilistic Rules (2001)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mtl:montde:2001-27

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