Fair Production and Allocation of an Excludable Nonrival Good

Francois Maniquet and Yves Sprumont ()

Cahiers de recherche from Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques

Abstract: We study fairness in economies with one private good and one partially excludable nonrival good. A social ordering function determines for each profile of preferences an ordering of all conceivable allocations. We propose the following Free Lunch Aversion condition: if the private good contributions of two agents consuming the same quantity of the nonrival good have opposite signs, reducing that gap improves social welfare. This condition, combined with the more standard requirements of Unanimous Indifference and Responsiveness, delivers a form of welfare egalitarianism in which an agent's welfare at an allocation is measured by the quantity of the nonrival good that, consumed at no cost, would leave her indifferent to the bundle she is assigned.

Keywords: fairness; excludable nonrival good; social orderings (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 14 pages
Date: 2002
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/1866/372 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Fair Production and Allocation of an Excludable Nonrival Good (2004)
Working Paper: Fair production and allocation of an excludable nonrival good (2004)
Working Paper: Fair Production and Allocation of an Excludable Nonrival Good (2002)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mtl:montde:2002-04

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Cahiers de recherche from Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sharon BREWER ().