In Search of Advice for Physicians in Entry-Level Medical Markets
Lars Ehlers
Cahiers de recherche from Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques
Abstract:
We consider entry-level medical markets for physicians in the United Kingdom. These markets experienced failures which led to the adoption of centralized market mechanisms in the 1960's. However, different regions introduced different centralized mechanisms. We advise physicians who do not have detailed information about the rank-order lists submitted by the other participants. We demonstrate that in each of these markets in a low information environment it is not beneficial to reverse the true ranking of any two acceptable hospital positions. We further show that (i) in the Edinburgh 1967 market, ranking unacceptable matches as acceptable is not profitable for any participant and (ii) in any other British entry-level medical market, it is possible that only strategies which rank unacceptable positions as acceptable are optimal for a physician.
Keywords: Matching Market; Incomete Information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D81 J44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 29 pages
Date: 2003
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hea, nep-lab and nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)
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http://hdl.handle.net/1866/504 (application/pdf)
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Working Paper: In Search of Advice for Physicians in Entry-Level Medical Markets (2003) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mtl:montde:2003-15
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