Solidarity in Choosing a Location on a Cycle

Sidartha Gordon ()

Cahiers de recherche from Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques

Abstract: We study the implications of two solidarity conditions on the efficient location of a public good on a cycle, when agents have single-peaked, symmetric preferences. Both conditions require that when circumstances change, the agents not responsible for the change should all be affected in the same direction: either they all gain or they all loose. The first condition, population-monotonicity, applies to arrival or departure of one agent. The second, replacement-domination, applies to changes in the preferences of one agent. Unfortunately, no Pareto-efficient solution satisfies any of these properties. However, if agents’ preferred points are restricted to the vertices of a small regular polygon inscribed in the circle, solutions exist. We characterize them as a class of efficient priority rules.

Keywords: Location Theory; Cycle; Efficiency, Polation-monotonicity, Reacement-Domination, Single-Peaked (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C79 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 34 pages
Date: 2006
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Solidarity in choosing a location on a cycle (2007)
Working Paper: Solidarity in Choosing a Location on a Cycle (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mtl:montde:2006-06

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