Relative Egalitarianism and Related Criteria

Yves Sprumont ()

Cahiers de recherche from Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques

Abstract: We reconsider the problem of aggregating individual preference orderings into a single social ordering when alternatives are lotteries and individual preferences are of the von Neumann-Morgenstern type. Relative egalitarianism ranks alternatives by applying the leximin ordering to the distributions of (0-1) normalized utilities they generate. We propose an axiomatic characterization of this aggregation rule and discuss related criteria.

Keywords: preference aggregation; lotteries; relative egalitarianism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D63 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 33 pages
Date: 2009
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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http://hdl.handle.net/1866/2738 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Relative Egalitarianism and Related Criteria (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mtl:montde:2009-02

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