(Minimally) 'epsilon'-Incentive Compatible Competitive Equilibria in Economies with Indivisibilities

Tommy Andersson, Lars Ehlers and Lars-Gunnar Svensson

Cahiers de recherche from Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques

Abstract: We consider competitive and budget-balanced allocation rules for problems where a number of indivisible objects and a fixed amount of money is allocated among a group of agents. In “small” economies, we identify under classical preferences each agent's maximal gain from manipulation. Using this result we find the competitive and budget-balanced allocation rules which are minimally manipulable for each preference profile in terms of any agent's maximal gain. If preferences are quasi-linear, then we can find a competitive and budget-balanced allocation rule such that for any problem, the maximal utility gain from manipulation is equalized among all agents.

Keywords: Epsilon-Incentive Compatibility; Competitive Allocation; Budget-Balance; Indivisibilities. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C78 D63 D71 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 13 pages
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mtl:montde:2012-03

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