Conditional Expected Utility

Massimiliano Amarante

Cahiers de recherche from Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques

Abstract: Let 'epsilon' be a class of event. Conditionally Expected Utility decision makers are decision makers whose conditional preferences ≿E, E є 'epsilon', satisfy the axioms of Subjective Expected Utility theory (SEU). We extend the notion of unconditional preference that is conditionally EU to unconditional preferences that are not necessarily SEU. We give a representation theorem for a class of such preferences, and show that they are Invariant Bi-separable in the sense of Ghirardato et al.[7]. Then, we consider the special case where the unconditional preference is itself SEU, and compare our results with those of Fishburn [6].

Keywords: Conditional expected utility; Unconditional preference; Invariant Bi-separable preference (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 19 pages
Date: 2013
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-upt
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Related works:
Journal Article: Conditional expected utility (2017)
Working Paper: Conditional Expected Utility (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mtl:montde:2013-02

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