Strategyproof choice of acts: beyond dictatorship

Eric Bahel () and Yves Sprumont ()

Cahiers de recherche from Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques

Abstract: We model social choices as acts mapping states of nature to (public) outcomes. A social choice function (or SCF) assigns an act to every profile of subjective expected utility preferences over acts. A SCF is strategyproof if no agent ever has an incentive to misrepresent her beliefs about the states of nature or her valuation of the outcomes; it is ex-post efficient if the act selected at any given preference profile picks a Pareto-efficient outcome in every state of nature. We offer a complete characterization of all strategyproof and ex-post efficient SCFs. The chosen act must pick the most preferred outcome of some (possibly different) agent in every state of nature. The set of states in which an agent's top outcome is selected may vary with the reported belief profile; it is the union of all the states assigned to her by a collection of bilaterally dictatorial and bilaterally consensual assignment rules.

Keywords: Social choice under uncertainty; strategyproofness; subjective expected utility; dictatorship; consensuality; bilaterality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 68 pages
Date: 2017
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic and nep-upt
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/1866/18917 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Strategyproof Choice of Acts: Beyond Dictatorship (2017)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mtl:montde:2017-01

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Cahiers de recherche from Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sharon BREWER ().