Dynamic refugee matching

Tommy Andersson, Lars Ehlers and Alessandro Martinello

Cahiers de recherche from Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques

Abstract: Asylum seekers are often assigned to localities upon arrival using uninformed matching systems, which lead to inefficient and unfair allocations. This paper proposes an informed dynamic mechanism as an intuitive and easy-to-implement alternative. Our mechanism can be adopted in any dynamic refugee matching problem given locality-specific quotas and that asylum seekers map into specific categories. Any matching selected by the proposed mechanism is Pareto efficient, and envy between localities is bounded by a single asylum seeker. Our simulations show that the proposed mechanism outperforms uninformed mechanisms even in presence of severe misclassification error in the estimation of asylum seeker categories.

Keywords: Forced migration; market design; refugee matching; dynamics; envy; efficiency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C78 D71 D78 F22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 36 pages
Date: 2018
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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http://hdl.handle.net/1866/21097 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Dynamic Refugee Matching (2018)
Working Paper: Dynamic Refugee Matching (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mtl:montde:2018-16

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