Strategy-proof choice under monotonic additive preferences

Eric Bahel () and Yves Sprumont ()

No 2020-06, Cahiers de recherche from Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques

Abstract: We describe the class of strategy-proof mechanisms for choosing sets of objects when preferences are additive and monotonic.

JEL-codes: D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des and nep-ore
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http://hdl.handle.net/1866/23366 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Strategy-proof Choice under Monotonic Additive Preferences (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mtl:montde:2020-06

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