Bureaucratic Corruption As a Constraint on Voter Choice

Leonard Dudley and Claude Montmarquette

Cahiers de recherche from Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques

Abstract: It Has Often Been Assumed That a Country's Tax Level, Tax Structure Progressivity and After-Tax Income Distribution Are Chosen by Voters Subject Only to Their Budget Constraints. This Paper Argues That At Certain Income Levels Voters' Decisions May Be Constrained by Bureaucratic Corruption. the Theoretical Arguments Are Developed in Asymmetry Limits the Capacity of the Fiscal System to Generate Revenues by Means of Direct Taxes. This Hypothesis Is Tested Witha Sample of International Data by Means of a Simultaneous Equation Model. the Distortions Resulting From Corruption Ar Captured Through Their Effects on a Latent Variable Defined As the Overall Fiscal Structure. Evidence Is Found of Causality Running From This Latent Variable to the Level of Taxes and the Degree of After Tax Inequality.

Keywords: Bureaucracy; Corruion; Asymmetry; Informa Tion; Fiscal Policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 36P. pages
Date: 1986
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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http://hdl.handle.net/1866/413 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Bureaucratic corruption as a constraint on voter choice (1987)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mtl:montde:8635

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