Signalling and Renegotiation in Competitive Contractual Markets

Paul Beaudry and Michel Poitevin

Cahiers de recherche from Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques

Keywords: Collective Bargaining; Game Theory; Contracts (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 55P. pages
Date: 1990
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Working Paper: SIGNALLING AND RENEGOTIATION IN COMPETITIVE CONTRACTUAL MARKETS (1990)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mtl:montde:9009

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