Toward a Political Theory of Environmental Policy

Marcel Boyer and Jean-Jacques Laffont

Cahiers de recherche from Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques

Abstract: This paper makes some steps toward a formal political economy of environmental policy. Economists' quasi-unanimous preferences for sophisticated incentive regulation is reconsidered. First, we recast the question of instrument choice in the general mechanism literature and provide an incomplete contract approach to political economy. Then, in various settings, we show why "constitutional" constraints on the instruments of environmental policy may be desirable, even though they appear inefficient from a purely standard economic viewpoint.

JEL-codes: D70 D71 Q20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 40 pages
Date: 1996
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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http://hdl.handle.net/1866/2083 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Toward a Political Theory of Environmental Policy (1996)
Working Paper: Toward a Political Theory of Environmental Policy (1996)
Working Paper: Toward a Political Theory of Environmental Policy (1996)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mtl:montde:9604

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