Contentious Contracts

Ulrich Hege and Pascale Viala

Cahiers de recherche from Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques

Abstract: This paper offers an explanation of rationally contracts where incompeteness refers to unforeseen contingencies. Agents enter a relationship with two-sided moral hazard in which a commitment to discard parts of the joint resources may be ex ante efficient.

JEL-codes: D82 K12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 39 pages
Date: 1997
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Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/1866/2022 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Contentious Contracts (2012)
Working Paper: Contentious Contracts (1998)
Working Paper: Contentious Contracts (1997)
Working Paper: Contentious Contracts (1997)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mtl:montde:9711

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