Every Choice Function is Backwards-Induction Rationalizable

Walter Bossert and Yves Sprumont

Cahiers de recherche from Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ

Abstract: A choice function is backwards-induction rationalizable if there exists a finite perfect-information extensive-form game such that, for each subset of alternatives, the backwards-induction outcome of the restriction of the game to that subset of alternatives coincides with the choice from that subset. We prove that every choice function is backwards-induction rationalizable.

JEL-codes: C72 D70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 19 pages
Date: 2013
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Every Choice Function Is Backwards‐Induction Rationalizable (2013)
Working Paper: Every Choice Function is Backwards-Induction Rationalizable (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mtl:montec:01-2013

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