Harsanyi's Social Aggregation Theorem: A Multi-Profile Approach with Variable-Population Extensions

Charles Blackorby, Walter Bossert and David Donaldson

Cahiers de recherche from Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ

Abstract: This paper provides new versions of Harsanyi's social aggregation theorem that are formulated in terms of prospects rather than lotteries. Strengthening an earlier result, fixed-population ex-ante utilitarianism is characterized in a multi-profile setting with fixed probabilities. In addition, we extend the social aggregation theorem to social-evaluation problems under uncertainty with a variable population and generalize our approach to uncertain alternatives, which consist of compound vectors of probability distributions and prospects.

Keywords: Harsanyi's social aggregation theorem; multi-profile social choice; population ethics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 D81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 33 pages
Date: 2003
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Working Paper: Harsanyi’s Social Aggregation Theorem: A Multi-Profile Approach with Variable-Population Extensions (2003)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mtl:montec:03-2003

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