Strategy-Proofness and Essentially Single-Valued Cores Revisited

Lars Ehlers

Cahiers de recherche from Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ

Abstract: We consider general allocation problems with indivisibilities where agents' preferences possibly exhibit externalities. In such contexts many different core notions were proposed. One is the ? -core whereby blocking is only allowed via allocations where the non-blocking agents receive their endowment. We show that if there exists an allocation rule satisfying individual rationality, efficiency, and strategy-proofness, then for any problem for which the ? -core is non-empty, the allocation rule must choose a ? -core allocation and all agents are indifferent between all allocations in the ? -core. We apply our result to housing markets, coalition formation and networks.

Keywords: General allocation problems; externalities; strategy-proofness; ? -core (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D61 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 26 pages
Date: 2014
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Strategy-proofness and essentially single-valued cores revisited (2018)
Working Paper: Strategy-proofness and essentially single-valued cores revisited (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mtl:montec:05-2014

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