Ordinally Consistent Tournament Solutions

Yves Sprumont ()

Cahiers de recherche from Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ

Abstract: A set ranking method assigns to each tournament on a given set an ordering of the subsets of that set. Such a method is consistent if (i) the items in the set are ranked in the same order as the sets of items they beat and (ii) the ordering of the items fully determines the ordering of the sets of items. We describe two consistent set ranking methods.

Keywords: tournaments; ranking methods (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 8 pages
Date: 2016
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Working Paper: Ordinally consistent tournament solutions (2016)
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