The Alleviation of Coordination Problems through Financial Risk Management
Marcel Boyer (),
Martin M. Boyer and
René Garcia ()
Cahiers de recherche from Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ
We characterize a firm as a nexus of activities and projects with their associated cashflow distributions across states of the world and time. With specialized managers intent on maximizing firm value, we show that such a representation leads to a transformation possibility frontier between the riskiness and expected value of cashflows. A firm reacts to changes in the market prices of risks by adjusting its value maximizing portfolio of real activities. We show that financial risk management can help to alleviate the reorganization and coordination problems related to the implementation of the desired adjustments. Empirically, we show that a firm's use of financial derivatives is linked to its reactivity to variations in risk prices. We also argue that financial risk management allows a firm to maintain its value in the presence of cashflow-at-risk or value-at-risk constraints.
Keywords: Risk Management; Firm Value; Hedging; Value at Risk (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G22 G31 G34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec and nep-rmg
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mtl:montec:06-2010
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