Consistent House Allocation

Lars Ehlers and Bettina Klaus (bettina.klaus@unil.ch)

Cahiers de recherche from Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ

Abstract: In practice we often face the problem of assigning indivisible objects (e.g., schools, housing, jobs, offices) to agents (e.g., students, homeless, workers, professors) when monetary compensations are not possible. We show that a rule that satisfies consistency, strategy-proofness, and efficiency must be an efficient generalized priority rule; i.e., it must adapt to an acylic priority structure, except - maybe - for up to three agents in each object's priority ordering.

Keywords: indivisible objects; priority structure; consistency; strategy-proofness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D63 D70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 16 pages
Date: 2005
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Consistent House Allocation (2007)
Working Paper: Consistent House Allocation (2005)
Working Paper: Consistent house allocation (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mtl:montec:08-2005

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