Sharing the Cost of a Public Good without Subsidies

Marc Fleurbaey and Yves Sprumont ()

Cahiers de recherche from Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ

Abstract: We study the construction of a social ordering function for the case of a public good financed by contributions from the population, and we extend the analysis of Maniquet and Sprumont (2004) to the case when contributions cannot be negative, i.e. agents cannot receive subsidies from others.

Keywords: social ordering; public good; maximin (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D63 D71 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 13 pages
Date: 2006
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Sharing the Cost of a Public Good without Subsidies (2009)
Working Paper: Sharing the Cost of a Public Good without Subsidies (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mtl:montec:08-2006

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